

2019 Conference on Economic Design Programme

Budapest, 12-14 June



Organised by the Mechanism Design research group,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences

<https://mechanismdesign.eu/>



Conference on Economic Design is the bi-annual conference of the Society of Economic Design.

The Keynote Speakers are:

- Leonid-Hurwicz Lecture: Philippe Jehiel (Paris School of Economics)
- Murat Sertel Lecture: Bhaskar Dutta (University of Warwick)
- Paul Kleindorfer Lecture: Bumin Yenmez (Boston College)

PC-members: Lars Ehlers (chair), Deniz Dizdar and Sean Horan (Université de Montréal), Dip Majumdar and Szilvia Papai (Concordia), Ata Atay, Péter Biró, and Ágnes Cseh (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Attila Tasnádi and Tamás Solymosi (Corvinus University of Budapest)

Local organisers: Péter Biró and the Mechanism Design research group. Contact address: 2019.ced@gmail.com

Summer School: On the Engineering Aspects of Economic Design: Voting and Matching (10-11 June). Tutorials on voting: Markus Brill, Sylvain Bouveret and Piotr Faliszewski; and on matchings: John P. Dickerson, Victor Hiller, David Manlove, Ana Viana, and Bumin Yenmez. See its programme here:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1i7fMJtGTpenySuzxH_Q6RCvuJ0f1x2D3/view

Co-located events of the ENCKEP COST Action:

The ENCKEP (European Network for Collaboration on Kidney Exchange Programmes) COST Action will have the following co-located events:

- Workshop: 10 June, internal for ENCKEP members
- Training School: 11 June, tutorials within the CED summer school
- Conference: 12 June, two embedded sessions in CED

Venues: The venue of CED is Corvinus University of Budapest, main building, at 1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8. The venue of the summer school and the ENCKEP events (10-11 June) is the HTK building of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1097 Tóth Kálmán u. 4. See the map here:

<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1uVx3JdggDFnAPII7uW-441fu5PcumIz1/view>

Sponsors: Corvinus University of Budapest, and its Faculty of Economics, and the Mechanism Design research group of Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Wifi in the rooms: SSID: Conference on Economic Design, Password: economy2019

Welcome drinks and registrations on 11 June between 19h-21h at Jónás Craft Beer House (soft drinks, beer and wine provided for all registered participants)

----- Day 1 (12 June) -----

8:00-9:00 Registrations in the Aula (where all the breaks take place)

9:00-11:00 1st parallel sessions

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:30 2nd parallel sessions

13:30-14:15 lunch break

14:15-14:30 Opening in room II.

14:30-15:30 Paul Kleindorfer Lecture by Bumin Yenmez: Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment

15:30-16:00 coffee break

16:00-18:00 3rd parallel sessions

----- Day 2 (13 June) -----

9:00-11:00 4th parallel sessions

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:30 5th parallel sessions

13:30-14:30 lunch break

14:30-15:30 Murat Sertel Lecture by Bhaskar Dutta: Conflict and Network Design

16:15-17:00 Optional social programme: guided tour in Matthias church

19:00-22:00 Conference dinner on boat Európa (starting from the opposite side of the Danube, opening at 19h, leaving sharply at 19:30h!)

----- Day 3 (14 June) -----

9:00-11:00 6th parallel sessions

11:00-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:30 7th parallel sessions

13:30-14:30 lunch break

14:30-15:30 Leonid-Hurwicz Lecture by Philippe Jehiel: Mechanism design with data-driven misspecifications

15:30-16:00 coffee break

16:00-18:00 8th parallel sessions

20:00- Informal going out to ruin pubs from Szimpla Kert (<https://szimpla.hu/>)

Breaks are in the Aula. Keynote lectures are in room II. Sessions are in rooms 236, 238, 330, 332, 3001 and 3005.

Schedule

	Room 236	Room 238	Room 330	Room 332	Room 3001	Room 3005
1st	Matching 1	Allocation problems 1	Voting and elections 1	Mechanism design 1	Bargaining	ENCKEP 1
2nd	Matching 2	Experiments	Social choice 1	Implementation 1	Cooperative games 1	ENCKEP 2
3rd	Matching 3	School choice 1	Voting and elections 2	Mechanism design 2	Markets 1	Teams and organisation
4th	Matching 4	Allocation problems 2	Social choice 2	Implementation 2	Auctions 1	Networks 1
5th	Assignment markets	School choice 2	Voting and elections 3	Mechanism design 3	Cooperative games 2	Axiomatic approach
6th	Matching 5	Allocation problems 3	Voting and elections 4	Contracts	Auctions 2	Contests and ranking
7th	Matching 6	School choice 3	Social choice 3	Mechanism design 4	Markets 2	Networks 2
8th	Matching 7	Allocation problems 4	Voting and elections 5	Social choice 4	Cooperative games 3	Public goods and reputation

1st parallel sessions (12 June, 9:00-11:00)

Room 236: Matching 1

- [Ana Mauleon](#), P. Jean-Jacques Herings and Vincent Vannetelbosch: Matching with Myopic and Farsighted Players
- [Sergei Balakin](#): Decentralized Two-Period Matching
- [Georgy Artemov](#), Yeon-Koo Che and Yinghua He: Strategic 'Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research
- [Eszter Bokányi](#), Anikó Hannák: Ride-share matching algorithms generate income inequality

Room 238: Allocation problems 1

- Duygu Yengin and [Youngsub Chun](#): No-Envy, Solidarity, and Strategy-Proofness in the Queueing Problem
- [Ethem Akyol](#): Allocation without Monetary Transfers: A Multi-Object Auction with "fake money"
- [Yan Long](#): Optimal budget-balanced ranking mechanisms to assign identical objects
- [Albin Erlanson](#): Optimal Allocations with Capacity Constrained Verification

Room 330: Voting and elections 1

- [Egor Ianovski](#): Electing a committee with constraints
- [Fatma Aslan](#), Jean Laine and Hayrullah Dindar: Choosing a Committee under Majority Voting
- Burak Can, [Péter Csóka](#) and Emre Ergin: How to choose a fair delegation?
- [Yukinori Iwata](#): Strategic nomination and strategy-proof voting procedures

Room 332: Mechanism design 1

- [Shuhei Morimoto](#): Strategy-proof Probabilistic Rules for the Division Problem of Identical Indivisible Goods with Single-Peaked Preferences
- [Caleb Koch](#): [Implementation with secrets](#)
- [Cuiling Zhang](#): [On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms](#)
- [Chun-Ting Chen](#): Correlation with Forwarding

Room 3001: Bargaining

- Thomas Choate, [John Weymark](#) and Alan Wiseman: Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation
- [Kemal Kivanc Akoz](#), Nejat Anbarci and Kang Rong: [Preemptive versus Counter Offers](#)
- Chiu Yu Ko and [Duozhe Li](#): Decentralized One-to-Many Bargaining
- Claus-Jochen Haake, Thorsten Upmann and [Papatya Duman](#): On the Decomposability of the Nash Bargaining Solution: an Application to Labor Markets

Room 3005: ENCKEP (kidney exchanges) 1

- Duncan C McElfresh, Hoda Bidkhori and [John P Dickerson](#): Scalable Robust Kidney Exchange
- Valentin Bartier, Yves Crama, [Bart Smeulders](#) and Frits Spieksma: Recourse in Kidney Exchange Programs
- Valeria Romanciuc and [Filipe Alvelos](#): Optimizing the kidney exchange problem with a budget for simultaneous crossmatch tests
- [Márton Döcső](#): Sequential Testing in Kidney Exchange Programs

2nd parallel sessions (12 June, 11:30-13:30)

Room 236: Matching 2

- [Marcelo Ariel Fernandez](#): Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truth-telling: A characterization result
- [Yoichi Kasajima](#) and Manabu Toda: Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
- [Ágnes Cseh](#) and [Attila Juhos](#): Pairwise preferences in the stable marriage problem
- [Wei-Cheng Chen](#) and Yi-Cheng Kao: Limiting applications in college admissions and evidence from conflicting examinations

Room 238: Experiments

- [Josue Ortega](#), Erel Segal-Halevi and Maria Kyropoulou: [Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice](#)
- [Rustamdjan Hakimov](#), Philipp Heller, Moromitsu Kurino and Dorothea Kübler: How to Avoid Black Markets for Appointments at Public Offices
- Yusuke Narita: Toward an Ethical Experiment

Room 330: Social choice 1

- [Arseniy Samsonov](#): Collective choice and the fragmentation of views
- [Sumiyo Nishiguchi](#): Bouletic/Deontic Modality, Liberalism and Social Choice
- [Kaname Miyagishima](#): Equity and time consistency for intertemporal social decisions
- [Norihito Sakamoto](#): Characterizations of Social Choice Correspondences Based on Equality of Capabilities in a Pure Exchange Economy

Room 332: Implementation 1

- [Guadalupe Correa-Lopera](#): Implementation Via Vote Delegation
- [Suyi Kim](#), Biung-Ghi Ju and Juan Moreno-Ternero: Historical accountability in the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions permits
- [Walter Trockel](#) and Claus-Jochen Haake: [Thoughts on Social Design](#)

Room 3001: Cooperative games 1

- [Mathieu Martin](#) and Zéphirin Nganmeni: The finagle point might not be within the core: a contradiction with Bräuning's result
- [Takayuki Oishi](#): A Generalization of Peleg's Representation Theorem on Constant-Sum Weighted Majority Games
- [Pedro Calleja](#), Francesc Llerena and Peter Sudhölter: [Monotonicity and weighted prenucleoli: A characterization without consistency](#)
- Márton Benedek, Tri-Dung Nguyen, Jörg Fliege: Primal and dual algorithms, and the number of iterations needed to compute the nucleolus

Room 3005: ENCKEP (kidney exchanges) 2

- [Jörgen Kratz](#): Triage in kidney exchange
- Virginia Costa, [Xenia Klimentova](#), Péter Biró, Ana Viana and Joao Pedro Pedroso: New Integer Programming Formulations for the Stable Exchange Problem
- Péter Biró, Márton, Gyetvai, [Radu-Stefan Mincu](#), Alex Popa and Utkarsh Verma: IP Solutions for International Kidney Exchange Programmes
- [Péter Biró](#), Walter Kern, Dömötör Pálvölgyi and Daniel Paulusma: International kidney exchange game

3rd parallel sessions (12 June, 16:00-18:00)

Room 236: Matching 3

- [Thayer Morrill](#) and Peter Troyan: Obvious Manipulations
- [Lars Ehlers](#) and Jordi Masso: Robust Design in Monotonic Matching Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance
- [Szilvia Papai](#) and Nickesha Ayoade: Deferred Acceptance with Efficiency Improvements
- [David Seymour](#) and Sinan Ertemel: Matching with Overlapping Quotas under Weak Preferences

Room 238: School choice 1

- [Emre Dogan](#): Immediate acceptance of over-demanded schools: A new school choice mechanism
- [Umut Dur](#), Thayer Morrill and William Phan: Family Ties: School Assignment With Siblings
- [Aram Grigoryan](#): Efficient, Strategy-proof and Priority Improving Assignment in School Choice
- [Vincent Meisner](#) and Jonas von Wangenheim: School choice and loss aversion

Room 330: Voting and elections 2

- [Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack](#) and Roland Pongou: Successful Leadership and Political Compromise
- [Carl Heese](#): [Large elections with conflict of Interest and costly information](#)
- Stefanos Leonardos, Daniel Reijsbergen and Georgios Piliouras: Weighted Voting on the Blockchain: Improving Consensus in Proof of Stake Protocols
- Huihui Ding and Cécile Aubert: Voter conformism and inefficient policies

Room 332: Mechanism design 2

- [Ryuji Sano](#): Dynamic Communication Mechanism Design
- [Qinggong Wu](#): Getting Information from Your Enemies
- [Tsuyoshi Adachi](#): Iterated weak dominance implementation under incomplete information

Room 3001: Markets 1

- [Beata Ciałowicz](#): Formal modelling of innovative competition in neo-Schumpeterian approach
- [Robert Somogyi](#) and Wouter Vergote: Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition with Capacity Uncertainty - Feasting on Leftovers
- [Kumar Rishabh](#): Bank as a Venture Capitalist
- [Jérôme Dollinger](#), Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch: R&D and market sharing agreements

Room 3005: Teams and organisations

- [Paul Schweinzer](#) and Alberto Vesperoni: A threshold model of urban development
- [Fuhai Hong](#) and Zhendong Yin: Collusion, Extortion and the Government's Organizational Structure
- [Guillaume Pommey](#): Partnership Dissolution with Cash-constrained Agents
- [Nadia Burani](#): What Determines Firms' Organizational Form? On Firms' Mission-Oriented and Workers' Motivation

4th parallel sessions (13 June, 9:00-11:00)

Room 236: Matching 4

- Antonio Romero Medina and Matteo Triossi: [Centralized Course Allocation](#)
- Christopher Kah, [Flip Klijn](#) and Markus Walzl: Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core
- [Antonio Nicolò](#), Arunava Sen, Sonal Yadav and Pietro Salmaso: Stable and efficient task assignment to pairs
- [Aleksandr Kondratev](#) and Alexander Nesterov: [Minimal Envy and Popular Matchings](#)

Room 238: Allocation problems 2

- Ágnes Cseh and [Tamás Fleiner](#): The complexity of cake cutting with unequal shares
- Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, [Min-Hung Tsay](#) and Chun-Hsien Yeh: A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds in bankruptcy problems
- Rustamdjan Hakimov and [Madhav Raghavan](#): Transparency of Centralised Allocation Mechanisms
- [Josep M Izquierdo](#): Decentralized rationing problems and the proportional rule

Room 330: Social choice 2

- [Abhinaba Lahiri](#) and Anup Pramanik: Top Inseparable Domains
- Jean Laine and [Onur Dogan](#): A note on strategy-proof preference aggregation
- [Rouzbeh Ghouchani](#) and Szilvia Pápai: Preference Aggregation for couples
- [Swagata Bhattacharjee](#): Dynamic Contracting For Innovation Under Ambiguity

Room 332: Implementation 2

- [Saptarshi Mukherjee](#), Nozomu Muto and Arunava Sen: Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to economic environments
- [Ville Korpela](#): (Interim) [Bayesian efficiency implies two-agent Bayesian Implementation](#)
- [Semih Koray](#) and Ayca Kaya: A Characterization of Solution Concepts Which Implement Only Monotonic Social Choice Rules

Room 3001: Auctions 1

- [Shraman Banerjee](#): Treating Symmetric Buyers Asymmetrically
- [Haomin Yan](#): [Position Auctions with Multi-unit Demands](#)
- [Maximilian Fichtl](#) and Martin Bichler: Computing Prices in Product-Mix Auctions with Strong Substitutes
- [Ricardo Goncalves](#), Konstantinos Georgalos, Indrajit Ray and Sonali Sen Gupta: Japanese English Auctions with Discrete Bid Levels: an experimental approach

Room 3005: Networks 1

- [Jobst Heitzig](#) and Ulrike Kornek: [Efficient but multiple equilibria in dynamic coalition formation with combinatorially complex state spaces](#)
- [Balázs Sziklai](#) and Balázs Lengyel: Opinion leaders - experts of social relations
- [Shaden Shabayek](#) and Francis Bloch: Pricing in Networks with Anonymized Information
- [Péter Bayer](#) and György Kozics: Best-response Dynamics in Directed Network Games

5th parallel sessions (13 June, 11:30-13:30)

Room 236: Assignment markets

- [Shigehiro Serizawa](#) and Yu Zhou: Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market
- [Ata Atay](#), Marina Nunez and Tamas Solymosi: On the core of many-to-many matching markets with transferable utility
- [Bettina Klaus](#) and Alexandru Nichifor: [Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices](#)
- [Lawrence Ausubel](#) and Oleg Baranov: VCG, the Core, and Assignment Stages in Auctions

Room 238: School choice 2

- [Martin Van der Linden](#) and Benoit Decerf: Manipulability in school choice
- [Nickesha Ayoade](#) and Szilvia Papai: School Choice with Preference Rank Classes
- M. Remzi Sanver and [Justin Kruger](#): An Arrowian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
- László Csató and [Csaba Tóth](#): [University rankings from the revealed preferences of the applicants](#)

Room 330: Voting and elections 3

- [Arnold Soh](#) and Marcus Pivato: Weighted representative democracy
- [Philip Grech](#): [A fresh look at a posteriori power with applications to the Council of the EU before and after Brexit](#)
- Luis Sánchez-Fernández, Noberto Fernández García, Jesús A. Fisteus and [Markus Brill](#): [The Maximin Support Method: An Extension of the D'Hondt Method to Approval-Based Multiwinner Elections](#)
- Constandina Koki and Stefanos Leonardos: Coalitions & Voting Power in the Greek Parliament of 2012: A Case-Study

Room 332: Mechanism design 3

- [Ruben Juarez](#) and Lining Han: [Truthful Intermediation with Monetary Punishment](#)
- [Martin Hagen](#): Refugee Relocation: A Procurement Perspective
- [Endre Csóka](#): [Efficient Teamwork](#)
- Saptarshi Mukherjee and Ruhi Sonal: Sequential entry and perfect equilibrium

Room 3001: Cooperative games 2

- [Bas Dietzenbacher](#): The procedural egalitarian solution and egalitarian stable games
- [Simon Hoof](#): Linear-state differential games in partition function form
- J.M. Alonso-Meijide, [Mikel Álvarez-Mozos](#), M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro and A. Jiménez-Losada: On convexity for games with externalities
- [Manuel Mágó](#): The average connected contribution value for graph games

Room 3005: Axiomatic approach

- [Takashi Akaoshi](#) and Yoichi Kasajima: Integration of multiple criteria: general properties of the lexicographic and constrained maximality
- Frank Page and [Jing Fu](#): Parameterized State-Contingent Games, K-Correspondences, and Blackwell Equilibria
- [Zephirin Nganmeni](#) and Martin Mathieu: A note on the finesse point

6th parallel sessions (14 June, 9:00-11:00)

Room 236: Matching 5

- [Asefeh Salarinezhad](#) and Szilvia Papai: Matching with Minimum Quotas
- [Sylvain Funck](#): Matching with couples with farsighted agents
- [David Delacretaz](#): [Stability in Matching Markets with Sizes](#)
- [Britta Hoyer](#) and Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Stability in Weighted College Admissions Problems

Room 238: Allocations problems 3

- Yan Long, Jay Sethuraman and [Jingyi Xue](#): Equal-quantile rules in resource allocation with uncertain needs
- [László Kóczy](#), Tamás Koltai, Balázs R. Sziklai and Alexandra Tamás: Apportionment methods in resource allocation
- [William Thomson](#): For claims problems, more on the minimal overlap rule
- [Marco Dall'Aglio](#): Fair division in the courtroom. Research ideas from an applied project.

Room 330: Voting and elections 4

- [Sébastien Courtin](#) and Annick Laruelle: Multi-dimensional rules
- Shurojit Chatterji, Souvik Roy, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Arunava Sen and [Huaxia Zeng](#): Probabilistic Generalized Median Voter Schemes: A Robust Characterization
- Ritxar Arlegi and [Dinko Dimitrov](#): Probabilistic manipulation of sequential voting procedures
- [Dipjyoti Majumdar](#) and Souvik Roy: A note on Probabilistic Voting Rules

Room 332: Contracts

- [Gülen Karakoç](#): Cheap Talk with Multiple Experts and Uncertain Biases
- [Xinyi Xu](#) and Rongzhu Ke: The Existence of Optimal Contracts in Moral Hazard Problems
- Rongzhu Ke: Ranking Information System Without the First Order Approach

Room 3001: Auctions 2

- [Helene Mass](#): Strategies under strategic uncertainty
- Lawrence Ausubel and [Oleg Baranov](#): [Revealed Preference and Activity Rules in Dynamic Auctions](#)
- [Aditya Vikram](#): Stability and double auction design
- [Sergei Severinov](#) and [Gabor Virag](#): Who wants to be an auctioneer?

Room 3005: Contest and ranking

- [László Csató](#): [Incentive compatible designs for tournament qualifiers with round-robin groups and repechage](#)
- [Marta Boczon](#) and Alistair J. Wilson: [Goals, constraints, and public assignment: A field study of the UEFA Champions League](#)
- [László Csató](#) and [Dóra Gréta Petróczy](#): [On the monotonicity of the eigenvector method](#)

7th parallel sessions (14 June, 11:30-13:30)

Room 236: Matching 6

- Abdoul Karim Sidibé: Many-to-one Matching with Sized Agents and Size-monotonic Priorities
- Dilek Sayedahmed and Szilvia Papai: Targeted Priority Reserves
- Orhan Aygun and Gunnur Ege Destan: Preserving Priorities in the Case of the Re-Placement of Medical Residents in Turkey
- Ágnes Cseh, Tamás Fleiner and Petre Harján: Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size

Room 238: School choice 3

- Péter Biró and Jens Gudmondsson: Complexity of finding Pareto-efficient allocations of highest welfare
- Inacio Bo, Li Chen: Designing Heaven's Will: Lessons in Market Design from the Chinese Imperial Civil Servants Match
- Nadja Stroh-Maraun: Efficiency in Weighted School Choice Problems

Room 330: Social choice 3

- Sonal Yadav: When is checking a subset of incentive-compatibility constraints sufficient for strategy-proofness? A Characterization and Applications
- Steven Kivinen and Norovsambuu Tumennasan: Robust Group Strategy-Proofness
- Peng Liu: A Large Class of Strategy-Proof Exchange Rules with Single-Peaked Preferences
- Oihane Gallo, Jorge Alcalde-Unzu and Marc Vorsatz: Strategy-proofness in a mixed domain of single-peaked and single-dipped preferences

Room 332: Mechanism design 4

- Hiroki Shinozaki, Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa: Strategy-proofness and Efficiency for Submodular and Supermodular Preferences without Quasi-linearity
- Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa: Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Priority-Argumented Object Allocation Problem with Discrete Payments
- Agnieszka Lipieta: The role of destructive mechanism within economic evolution

Room 3001: Markets 2

- Hyunwoo Hong and Biung-Ghi Ju: An Employment Model of Social Enterprises and the Effects of Government Subsidy
- Mariana Cunha and Filipa Mota: Coordination effects of Corporate Social Responsibility
- Barna Bakó and Péter Isztin: Heads in the Sand: The Consequences of Information Aversion on Product Markets

Room 3005: Networks 2

- Ravi Jagadeesan and Alexander Teytelboym: Market imperfections in trading networks
- Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Ildikó Schlotter and Alexander Teytelboym: Complexity of Stability in Trading Networks
- Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon and Chenghong Luo: Network Formation with Myopic and Farsighted players
- Akylai Taalaibekova: Who matters in coordination problems on networks: myopic or farsighted agents?

8th parallel sessions (14 June, 16:00-18:00)

Room 236: Matching 7

- Wei-Cheng Chen and Yi-Cheng Kao: [Expanding Applications in College Admissions](#)
- Ning Sun and Zaifu Yang: Efficiency, Stability, and Commitment in Senior Level Job Matching Markets
- Jinyong Jeong: Housing Market with Contracts
- Kolos Csaba Ágoston, Péter Biró, Endre Kováts and Zsuzsanna Jankó: College admissions with ties and common quotas: Integer programming approach

Room 238: Allocation problems 4

- Pietro Salmaso, Antonio Nicolò, Arunava Sen and Sonal Yadav: Stable Task Allocation
- Mridu Prabal Goswami, Manipushpak Mitra and Soumendu Sarkar: Strategyproof and Fair Allocations with Negative Externality
- Jun Zhang: On truncation-invariant allocation mechanism
- Yuki Tamura: Endowment Manipulations in Probabilistic Assignment Problem

Room 330: Voting and elections 5

- Di Feng, Shusen Qi and Hang Sun: Pre-voting communication of corporate boards and its implications on board decision-making and boardroom politics
- Dezső Bednay, Anna Moskalenko and Attila Tasnádi: Dictatorship versus manipulability
- Isabelle Lebon, Herrade Igersheim, Antoinette Baujard and Jean-François Laslier: Is evaluative voting empirically stable under different grading scales?

Room 332: Social choice 4

- Hirofumi Yamamura and Makoto Hagiwara: [Upper set rules with binary ranges](#)
- Peter Katuscak and Thomas Kittsteiner: Strategy-proofness Made Simpler
- Andrew Mackenzie and Yu Zhou: Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms

Room 3001: Cooperative games 3

- André Casajus and Frank Huettner: The canonical extension of the Shapley value for cooperative games with externalities
- Room Lucian-Ionut Gavrilă and Alexandru Popa: A novel algorithm for clearing financial obligations between companies - an application within the Romanian Ministry of Economy
- Tamás Solymosi, Péter Csóka and Ferenc Illés: On the Shapley value of liability games
- Frederic Chantreuil, Sébastien Courtin and Rodrigue Tido Takeng: Naive Individualism and Decomposer Functions

3005: Public goods and reputation

- Tomoya Tajika: [Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game](#)
- Ryusuke Shinohara: Voluntary Representative Negotiation and Public Good Provision: Strategic Delegation and Regional Welfare
- Sándor Bozóki, László Csató, Péter Egri, Ádám Huszárík, Ádám Szaller and József Váncza: Trust mechanisms
- Ayca Ozdogan Atabay: On behavioral implications of reputations